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Do personality differences explain the gender pay gap? 





We use data from an employee survey conducted in Russia, Armenia and Kazakhstan 
to study the contribution of gender differences in personality to gender differences in pay.  In 
particular, we focus on the influence of locus of control (LOC) because there is evidence 
from studies conducted in developed market economies suggesting that individuals with an 
internal LOC (i.e. those who believe that their success is determined by own actions) 
demonstrate greater initiative and better performance than individuals with an external LOC 
(i.e. those who believe that their success is determined by external forces). Similar to these 
studies, we find that among the participants of our survey,  men are more likely to exhibit an 
internal LOC, while women are more likely to have an external LOC.  Gender differences in 
LOC are particularly large among Russian employees, while very small in the Kazakhstan 
sample. Additionally, we find that an internal LOC is associated with higher pay for both 
male and female participants of the Armenian and Russian surveys. In Kazakhstan, the 
estimated effects of LOC are positive, but small and very noisy. The results from the Oaxaca-
Blinder-Neumark wage gap decomposition show that among the participants of the surveys, 
gender differences in LOC explain 5.5% of the gender pay gap in Armenia, 7% of the gap in 
Russia, and 2.7% of the gap in Kazakhstan. We suggest possible explanations for the 
observed cross-country differences and discuss policy implications. 
 
JEL Classification: A12, J31, J71, P52 




It is a well-established fact that women’s earnings are lower than men’s earnings, 
although the size of the gender pay gap varies with the characteristics of labor market 
institutions and degree of economic development (Blau and Kahn 2003, Brainerd 2000).  It 
would probably be accurate to say that substantial gender differences in pay have been found 
in all countries ever studied by economists. Why are the earnings of men and women so 
different? Do observed discrepancies in earnings reflect true gender differences in 
productivity, or are they a consequence of discriminatory practices exercised by employers? 
Studies conducted in developed market economies find that part of the gender pay 
differential is attributable to the variation in education and experience by gender (see, for 
example, Blau 1998 and Gunderson 1989). Gender segregation was found to be particularly 
important in explaining male-female earnings differences in transition economies (Jurajda 
2003, Ogloblin 1999). Nevertheless, these factors explain only a limited portion of the gender 
pay gap, and the remaining difference is typically regarded as a measure of gender 
discrimination. 
The recent literature recognizes that taking into account skills and cognitive abilities 
may not be enough when studying individual differences in productivity. Indeed, an 
impressive array of research shows that performance is influenced by personality, where the 
considered personality traits include preference for performing in competitive environments 
(Gneezy et al. 2003, Niederle and Vesterlund 2006), individual locus of control (Andrisani 
1977, Goldsmith et al. 2000, Heckman et al. 2006, Linz and Semykina 2006, Osborne Groves 
2005, Semykina and Linz 2006), self-esteem (Goldsmith et al. 1997, Heckman et al. 2006, 
Murnane et al. 2001), and others. These findings demonstrate that certain personality traits 
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entail productivity-enhancing non-cognitive skills and should be incorporated into the 
earnings analysis. 
Numerous psychological studies find that personality traits tend to vary by gender 
(Feingold 1994, Kling et al. 1999, Smith et al. 1997, and references therein), which suggests 
that personality may contribute to the discrepancies in earnings of men and women. 
However, research investigating this issue is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
studies consider personality factor in the analysis of gender pay gap. Mueller and Plug (2004) 
use data from the Longitudinal Study of Wisconsin high school graduates to examine the 
contribution of personality traits to gender differences in pay. In one of our earlier studies 
(Semykina and Linz 2006), we analyze personality differences by gender and male-female 
differences in pay among Russian workers. Both studies find that gender differences in 
personality explain part of the gender pay gap, which underscores the importance of further 
research in this area. 
Although the influence of non-cognitive skills on productivity and earnings is well-
documented in the literature, the existing evidence is based predominantly on the studies of 
developed market economies. Whether the same results hold in other economic environments 
– such as less developed countries and transition economies – requires separate investigation. 
Similarly, relatively little is known about gender differences in personality in less developed 
and former socialist countries. The goal of our study is to address this gap in the literature by 




                                                 
1
 Although the transition to market may have already been completed, we will still refer to these economies as 
transition economies. 
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We use data collected in 2005 from employees in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia 
to examine gender differences in personality and their role in explaining the gender earnings 
gap. We argue that as the market economy emerges and labor markets develop, wages will 
begin to match labor productivity, and non-cognitive skills will be rewarded in a manner 
consistent with what has been found in developed market economies. That is, earnings of 
men and women will be influenced by personality characteristics, and the effect will vary 
between men and women.  
A specific personality trait that we consider is Rotter’s locus of control (Rotter 1966), 
which describes an individual’s propensity to attribute own success to either personal actions 
(an internal locus of control) or external forces (external locus of control). Similar to the 
studies conducted in developed market economies, we find that internal locus of control is 
associated with higher earnings. We also find that gender differences in personality among 
the participants of our surveys essentially match those reported in existing studies; in 
particular, men tend to be more internal than women. Among Armenian and Russian 
employees, gender differences in personality explain a nontrivial part of the gender pay gap. 
The significance of our results is twofold. First, we show that personality affects 
earnings of workers in these three transition economies, which implies that non-cognitive 
skills enhance labor productivity in various economic environments. And second, we 
demonstrate that a part of the gender pay gap that would regularly be attributed to 
discrimination is in fact a market response to differences in productivity by gender.  
Our findings have important implications for the studies of gender pay gap, since they 
suggest that our understanding of the underlying sources of the gender differences in pay can 
be improved by considering personality factor. Additionally, our findings have direct policy 
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implications, since they suggest that gender pay gap can be reduced via the introduction of 
special training programs aimed at improving non-cognitive skills among women. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The discussion of the concept of locus 
of control and its relation to earnings and gender in developed and former socialist 
economies is presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains the description of the data used in our 
analysis. Methodological issues related to gender pay gap decomposition and estimation of 
personality effects on earnings are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains empirical 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Motivation 
In this study, we consider a particular personality trait – locus of control (LOC). The 
concept of LOC was introduced by Rotter (1966) and is based on the observation that some 
individuals tend to attribute their achievements to internal forces, such as personal effort and 
hard work, while others tend to attribute personal success and failure to external forces, such 
as fate or chance. Individuals in the former group are said to have an internal LOC, while 
individuals in the latter group are said to have an external LOC. Because of the anticipation 
that personal effort leads to desired rewards, internals are expected to demonstrate greater 
initiative and exert greater effort than externals. Consequently, individuals with an internal 
LOC should perform better and be more productive than individuals with an external LOC. 
The validity of the LOC concept was studied by many researchers in various contexts, 
and findings of these studies confirm the major theoretical conclusions. Specifically, it was 
found that, in comparison to externals, individuals with an internal LOC expend more effort 
to control circumstances, set harder goals, make better use of information, perform better on 
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complex assignments, are more motivated to work, and are better leaders (see Spector 1982 
and references therein). On the productivity side, internal LOC was found to be associated 
with higher earnings (Andrisani 1977 1981, Goldsmith et al. 2000, Heckman et al. 2006
2
, 
Linz and Semykina 2006a 2006b, Osborne Groves 2005, Semykina and Linz 2006) and 
better performance (Linz and Semykina 2006a, 2006b). 
Another issue that has received substantial attention in the literature and is important 
for our study is gender differences in LOC. Although some studies find no significant gender 
differences in LOC (Mueller 2004, Feingold 1994), there is extensive evidence showing that 
men tend to be more internal than women (Costa et al. 2001, Hall 1984, Maccoby and Jacklin 
1974, Sherman et al. 1997, Smith at al. 1997)
3
. Overall, the notion of men being more 
internal seems to prevail in the literature, and this result was found to hold in various cultural 
and economic environments (Semykina and Linz 2006, Smith at al. 1997). 
Why would women be less internal than men? Psychological research suggests that 
gender differences in LOC originate from the social roles associated with each gender 
(Feingold 1994, Smith at al. 1997). Men are traditionally viewed as leaders and tend to 
occupy dominating roles, while women’s traditional responsibilities are related to 
housekeeping and childbearing/childcare. Although the views of gender roles have largely 
changed in recent decades, gender stereotypes were found to be very robust (see Feingold 
1994 for references). As suggested in the literature, prevailing social norms and expectations 
create an environment that is less responsive to women’s efforts for achievement, which 
leads to the development of external LOC in women. 
                                                 
2
 Heckman et al. (2006) use a composite measure, which is the standardized sum of scores on the Rotter’s LOC 
and Rosenberg’s self-esteem scales. 
3
 Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) find that gender differences in LOC are not present in children, but emerge in the 
college years. Among other literatures, the studies of adults tend to find gender differences (greater male 
internality) more often than do studies of children. 
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Since gender differences in personality appear to favor men in terms of labor market 
outcomes, it is expected that personality can help to explain part of the gender pay gap. We 
may be relatively confident in expecting such an outcome for developed countries, where the 
relationship between LOC and earnings is well-established. However, particular 
considerations are necessary when studying transition economies. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet regime, wages in former Soviet economies were 
centrally-determined. Remuneration for labor was higher for employees with advanced 
educational degrees and in particular sectors of the economy; similarly, as workers acquired 
more experience and achieved supervisory status, they were paid more. However, despite the 
fact that wage determination was based on formal credentials and records of work 
experience, it was rather vaguely related to actual productivity. Moreover, other productivity 
enhancers (including motivation and personality traits), which were not supported by any sort 
of certificate, were not considered in the wage allocation among workers.  
It is also likely that under the wage-grid remuneration system the actual productivity 
of employees was not affected by their LOC. As suggested in the literature (Spector 1982, 
Kren 1992), individuals with an internal LOC are motivated to expend effort only if they 
believe that their actions will be rewarded. Under the Soviet wage remuneration system, 
workers could be rather certain that their initiative and effort would not lead to a wage 
increase (nor would the absence of those lead to a wage cut), and so, there were no incentives 
to work hard. 
Since early 1990s former socialist countries have undergone substantial economic 
changes that led to the establishment of a direct relationship between productivity and wages. 
In Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia, like other transition economies, privatization of state-
 9 
owned enterprises and elimination of soft budget constraints pushed the managers to look for 
new profit-maximizing strategies. The centrally-determined wage system was demolished 
and, with the exception of the public sector, enterprises have been given freedom to develop 
their own rules for setting wages. One of the consequences was the change in the 
remuneration approach, so that the monetary reward became more tightly linked to labor 
productivity.
4
 The adjustment process went differently in each country, and in some cases it 
was more successful than in others. However, as long as earnings reflect workers’ inputs into 
the production process, personality traits will, by default, be rewarded in the labor markets. 
Despite the declarations of fairness and equal opportunities for men and women, the 
gender pay gap in Soviet-type economies was substantial (Brainerd 2000, Newell and Reilly 
1996). Since the beginning of the transition, gender differences in earnings persisted and 
remained at relatively high levels (Brainerd 2000, Newell and Reilly 2001). In the three 
countries considered in this study, gender wage inequality increased by early 2000. In Russia, 
women’s earnings were on average 67 to 70% of men’s earnings during the mid- and late- 
1990s (Brainerd 2000, Newell and Reilly 2001, Ogloblin 1999), but dropped to about 63% in 
2000 (Ogloblin 2005, World Bank 2002). In Kazakhstan, the female to male wage ratio was 
72 to 75% in late 1990s (Newell and Reilly 2001, World Bank 2002), but fell to 60% in 2000 
(World Bank 2002). In Armenia, the wage ratio was slightly more than 55% in 2000 (World 
Bank 2002). Although a substantial part of the gender gap in transition economies was found 
to be attributable to gender differences in observed characteristics, a significant portion of the 
gap remained unexplained (Newell and Reilly 2001, Ogloblin 1999). 
We argue that another factor – personality – contributes to gender differences in pay 
in former socialist economies. As discussed above, individuals with internal LOC exhibit 
                                                 
4
 For example, returns to education in Russia have increased substantially by late 1990s (Clark 2002). 
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greater initiative and better performance in complex-task situations. These characteristics are 
particularly important in changing economic environments, and, if markets operate properly, 
earnings should be higher among workers with internal LOC. Moreover, there is evidence 
suggesting that women in former socialist countries are less internal than men (Smith at al. 
1997). This is not surprising, given that both before and after the collapse of the Soviet 
regime the majority of senior positions in these countries were held by men, while women 
spent a large amount of time in housekeeping and childcare activities
5
. 
In this study, we examine whether personality does indeed play a significant role in 
explaining gender differences in pay in former Soviet countries. By considering workers in 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia – countries that are rather different economically and 
culturally – we hope to shed some light on the importance of personality in determining 
gender pay gap in these economies and study how this is related to country-specific 
economic and cultural conditions. 
 
3. Data 
Since the early 1990s, large nationally representative samples of workers in transition 
economies became available. Collected by the World Bank, national statistical agencies and 
educational and research institutions, these data contain comprehensive information about 
demographics, incomes, expenditures, and employment histories. However, in spite of the 
variety of collected information, the content of these data remains somewhat limited. In 
particular, to the best of our knowledge, there are no nationally representative surveys of 
former socialist economies that collect data on personality. Therefore, in order to facilitate 
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 Gronau (2006) reports that in transitional Russia married women spent more than 35 hours a week in home 
work and childcare, although the amount of home production revealed a tendency to decline. Petrosyan (2005) 
presents the evidence of women doing most of the housework in Armenia. 
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the analysis, we used data from our own surveys, where we were able to inquire about 
personality traits and work-related attitudes of the respondents. 
We use data collected in May and June 2005 in selected cities in Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia. In Armenia, survey questionnaires were distributed at 159 
enterprises in Yerevan; in Kazakhstan, the data were collected from the employees at 163 
enterprises in Almaty and several other cities; in Russia, the survey was conducted among 
the employees at 99 enterprises in Ufa. Because of limited funding, representative samples of 
workers in the cities could not be collected; however, all attempts have been made to make 
the pool of respondents diverse
6
. Although we understand that our data are not representative 
at the national level, we will refer to the corresponding data sets as Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia, for convenience. 
Once we restrict our data to the respondents who provide information on their 
earnings, personality, and other variables used in our analysis, we obtain samples that consist 
of 1238 observations in Armenia, 699 observations in Kazakhstan, and 773 observations in 
Russia. The descriptive statistics for all three samples are reported in Table 1. Age 
characteristics of workers in our Russian and Armenian samples are very similar to those 
obtained from nationally representative surveys of workers in transition economies (see, for 
example, Brainerd 2000). If we look at an “average” participant of Russian or Armenian 
survey, it was a person in his/her late thirties with about 15 years of schooling. Kazakh 
employees are very similar in terms of educational qualifications, but they are somewhat 
younger and more active in changing jobs. Job attachment is the greatest among Russian 
                                                 
6
 Local project coordinators in Ufa, Yerevan, and Almaty were instructed to contact top-level managers in a 
wide variety of workplaces to request permission to conduct a survey of their employees. Once permission was 
granted, the interviewers were instructed to have questionnaires completed by workers in as many occupational 
categories, as possible. Further details on the data and data collection process can be found in Linz and 
Semykina (2006b). 
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survey participants, and their average job tenure is slightly longer than that reported in recent 
studies by Ogloblin (2005) and Ogloblin and Brock (2005). Additionally, state employees are 
overrepresented in our Russian sample. In Kazakhstan, the share of supervisors among male 
employees is somewhat small. Thus, there appear to be discrepancies between our samples 
and representative samples of Armenian, Kazakh, and Russian workers. However, the impact 
of these differences on the estimates of personality effects should be substantially reduced 
once we control for employee and workplace characteristics in our earnings regressions. 
The ratios of average female earnings to average male earnings are reported at the 
bottom of Table 1. The estimate in our Russian sample is 0.62, which is rather similar to the 
nationally representative estimates reported by Ogloblin (2005) and the World Bank (2002). 
Earnings of the female participants of the Kazakhstan and Armenian surveys are relatively 
high. The females to males earnings ratio is 0.75 in our Armenian sample and 0.8 in 
Kazakhstan. As reported by the World Bank (2002), in 2000 the gender wage ratios in 
Armenia and Kazakhstan were 0.55 and 0.6, respectively, which is well below our estimates. 
However, the time lag between the UNICEF Transmonee surveys, whose data were used by 
the World Bank, and our surveys is rather large. Therefore, we cannot assess whether the 
observed discrepancies are due to differences in sampling procedures or due to changes in 
economic conditions of these countries.
7
 
As mentioned above, the survey instrument contained a set of questions that allowed 
us to evaluate the LOC of the survey participants. To construct the LOC measure, we use ten 
statements from Rotter (1966). Five statements represent the internal LOC, and five are for 
the external LOC (see Table 2). The respondents were asked to specify their degree of 
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 For instance, rapid economic growth in Kazakhstan since 2000 (Becker et al. 2005) might have lead to 
substantial changes in the wage structure in this country. 
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agreement with each statement using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, and 5 = 
strongly disagree). To construct the composite LOC measure, we summed up the scores from 
the internal questions and subtracted the scores from the external questions. Thus, our LOC 
measure can change from -20 to +20 and is greater for workers with internal LOC. We 
checked the validity of this composite measure by computing reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach alpha) for each survey. In all three data sets the estimated coefficients were 
sufficiently large (0.75 in Armenian sample, 0.69 in Kazakhstan, and 0.6 in Russia), 
indicating that respondents considered the questions to be tightly related. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Earnings gap decomposition 
The impact of various factors on individual earnings is usually modeled by specifying 
a log earnings equation 
,ln εβ += Xw        (1) 
where ln w is the natural logarithm of earnings, X is a row vector of explanatory variables, β  
is a column vector of parameters, and ε is the error term. When equation (1) is estimated 
separately for men and women, the parameter vectors will be different for each gender and 
will represent the gender-specific returns to considered characteristics. 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) suggested that after equation (1) is estimated 
separately for each gender using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, the gender pay 
gap can be written as a difference in average log earnings of men and women: 
wwmmwm XXww ββ
ˆˆlnln −=−      (2) 
 14 
In equation (2), mwln  and wwln  are the average log earnings of men and women, 
respectively, mX is the vector of average characteristics of men, wX is the vector of average 
characteristics of women, mβ̂ and wβ̂ are the vectors of estimated coefficients in men’s and 
women’s equations, respectively, and the error terms disappear because the average value of 
residuals in the OLS regression is zero. 
Furthermore, the decomposition technique proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) helps to separate out the two parts of the gender pay gap: 
[ ],)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnln wwmmwmwm XXXXww βββββ −+−+−=−  (3) 
where β̂  represents a non-discriminatory wage structure – the vector of returns to the 
observed characteristics that would prevail in the market in the absence of gender 
discrimination. The first term in equation (3) is the “explained” part of the gap that is due to 
gender differences in the observed characteristics, while the term in brackets represents the 
“unexplained” part of the gap, which is usually attributed to gender discrimination. 
Originally, it was proposed that either mβ̂  or wβ̂ can be used to describe the non-
discriminatory wage structure; however, later several alternative methods were developed 
(Cotton 1988, Neumark 1988, Oaxaca and Ransom 1994, Reimers 1983). In this study, we 
use the methodology proposed by Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), who 
suggest estimating β̂  by running a pooled log earnings regression. This approach is 
appealing because it considers both male and female earnings when deriving the non-
discriminatory wage structure from the data. 
 
4.2. Specification of earnings equations 
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As a dependent variable in our earnings equations we use the natural logarithm of 
monthly earnings on the main job. The key explanatory variable that we want to study is the 
LOC measure. Since it is important to understand how results change once personality is 
incorporated in the analysis, we estimate earnings equations and perform gender gap 
decomposition with and without LOC variable, and examine how conventional estimates (no 
LOC in the equations) compare to those obtained from the extended regressions (LOC 
included). For each country, the LOC measure was standardized to have a zero mean and unit 
variance. 
Our goal is to examine whether equally qualified workers employed in similar jobs 
receive different remuneration because of their personality (non-cognitive skills), and study 
how personality traits affect gender differences in pay; therefore, in our regressions we 
control for various employee and workplace characteristics. Specifically, in the vector of 
observed characteristics (X) we include years of schooling, age and its square (to proxy for 
general experience), tenure and its square (to control for the firm-specific experience), a 
dummy variable equal to one if the employee has supervisory responsibilities, a dummy 
variable equal to one if the worker was unemployed for more than two weeks within the last 
five years, number of job changes within the last five years, an indicator for state-owned 
enterprises, and industry dummies. A reach set of controls allows us to evaluate the net effect 
of personality on earnings and helps to mitigate the effects that may be specific to our 
samples. 
We estimate earnings equations separately for pooled, men’s and women’s samples, 
which allows us to see how the effect of personality differs by gender. In the pooled 
regressions, we use weights to account for the excessively large proportions of female 
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workers in our data. In particular, male observations were assigned a greater weight to mimic 
the gender composition of the working population in each country
8
. Estimates from the 
weighted pooled regressions were used as a non-discriminatory earnings structure in equation 
(3). 
 
4.3. Endogeneity of LOC in earnings equations 
A problem that we need to address before estimating the effect of LOC on earnings is 
the potential endogeneity of the LOC measure. As discussed in the literature (Spence 1982, 
Bowles et al. 2001), locus of control may be affected by previous experiences, such as 
earnings, promotions, and various rewards. If current earnings influence workers’ LOC, then 
the direction of causality in the earnings equations can be questioned. Another possible 
source of endogeneity is a measurement error. Our LOC measure is not perfect, and if the 
measurement error is correlated with the LOC variable, the OLS estimator will be biased. 
Regarding the first problem, we argue that the reversed causality issue is unlikely to arise in 
our regressions. As shown by McCrae and Costa (1990) and Costa and McCrae (1997), 
personality traits develop in young ages and are very stable in adults. Since the average age 
of our respondents is far beyond 30, we expect that their LOC has been already shaped. 
Whether the measurement error is correlated with the reported LOC scores is not known a 
priori. 
To find out whether the LOC measure is endogenous in our log earnings equations we 
run several tests. Goldsmith et al. (2000) suggest that family background characteristics and 
accumulated assets can be used as instruments for LOC. Therefore, as potential instruments 
                                                 
8
 The data on the gender composition of the pool of employed workers in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia 
were obtained from the Armenian Statistics Yearbook 2005, Database of Gender Statistics at World Bank, and 
Rosstat (Russian Statistical Agency) website, respectively. 
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we consider family background (parents’ education, an indicator for living with both parents 
before age 16, an indicator for those who grew up in a large city) and assets (an indicator 
equal to one if either respondent or respondent’s spouse owns an apartment, an indicator 
equal to one if either respondent or respondent’s spouse owns a car, an indicator equal to one 
if either respondent or respondent’s spouse owns a garden house). We use Sargan’s test for 
overidentifying restrictions to check the validity of these instruments. Here we only report 
the results for pooled regressions, since these regressions were used for estimating the non-
discriminatory earnings structure. In earnings equations for Russian workers, two asset 
variables (an indicator for apartment owners and an indicator for garden house owners) and 
all family background variables were found to be valid instruments; the hypothesis that the 
instruments were not correlated with the error term could not be rejected at any conventional 
significance level ( 219χ  = 23.27, p-value = 0.226). In Armenian data, only family background 
variables turned out to be valid instruments ( 217χ  = 24.32, p-value = 0.111). In earnings 
equations for Kazakhstan, both assets and family background were found to be correlated 
with the error, so we were unable to find valid instruments there. 
We then test for endogeneity of the LOC variable in the earnings equations for 
Armenian and Russian employees and find no evidence of endogeneity bias
9
. In the pooled 
samples, heteroskedasticity-robust test-statistics were F1, 672 = 1.21 (p-value = 0.272) for 
Armenia and F1, 1210 = 0.01 (p-value = 0.919) for Russia
10
. Thus, the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity bias could not be rejected at any conventional significance level. The tests 
                                                 
9
 When testing for endogeneity we use a simple variable addition test described by Wooldridge (2002, Section 
6.2.1). 
10
 We must note that these results may be partly due to the fact that our instruments are only weakly correlated 
with the LOC measure. Although the instruments are jointly significant in the first-stage regressions in Armenia 
(F18, 1194 = 2.36, p-value = 0.001), they are only marginally significant in regressions for Russian workers (F21, 
653 = 1.54, p-value = 0.063). In both cases, the F-statistics are not large, so we are not able to rule out the 
possibility of the weak-instruments problem (Stock and Yogo 2002). 
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performed on men’s and women’s samples produced similar results. Therefore, we conclude 
that OLS estimation is the appropriate method for estimating earnings equations for 
Armenian and Russian workers. Since we have no means to either test or correct for 




5.1. Gender differences in personality 
The mean responses to questions used in construction of the LOC measure are 
reported in Table 3. For each respondent, LOC was computed as described in Section 3. It 
appears that, among Armenian and Russian participants, women on average score lower on 
the internal items and higher on the external ones. While gender differences for each 
particular item are minor, when combined together they reveal notable gender differences. 
The mean of the LOC measure is larger for men, and gender differences are statistically 
significant, which implies that among Armenian and Russian participants men tend to be 
more internal than women. In Kazakhstan, no significant gender differences emerge, as 
women may score higher on some internal items, while men may sometimes score higher on 
external items. 
Comparison of the LOC distributions by gender (Figure 1) shows that personality 
differences found in Armenian and Russian data hold over the entire range of the LOC 
scores. Men’s distributions are shifted to the right indicating that men are more likely to have 
an internal LOC, and these gender differences are particularly large among Russian 
employees. The situation is somewhat obscure in Kazakhstan. Among workers with extreme 
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values of LOC, men tend to be more internal; however, among the survey participants with 
the LOC that is close to sample average, women tend to be more internal. 
The results obtained for Kazakhstan are atypical, so we question whether they are due 
to the unusual composition of our sample. As was mentioned earlier, a relatively small 
proportion of male participants in Kazakhstan hold supervisory responsibilities, and previous 
research has shown that employees in senior positions tend to be more internal (Smith at al. 
1997). Since women in the Kazakhstan sample have an advantage in terms of seniority, this 
may partly explain the unusual LOC patterns. To separate out the gender effect from the 
position effect, we compare the LOC distributions for male and female workers with and 
without supervisory responsibilities. The estimated distributions, shown in Figure 2, confirm 
the results for Armenian and Russian employees – for both position levels, male participants 
of the surveys are more internal than female participants. Analogous gender differences in 
personality are found among Kazakh employees with supervisory responsibilities. Only for 
Kazakh workers without supervisory responsibilities is the relationship reversed. It appears 
that among the participants of the Kazakhstan survey, men who did not move up the career 
ladder tend to be external. 
 
5.2. LOC and earnings: descriptive analysis 
As a motivation for our regression analysis, we look at a general relationship between 
LOC and log earnings in our data. As seen in Table 4, average earnings of Armenian 
employees grow as LOC increases. In Russian sample, a positive relationship between LOC 
and earnings is strong for men, but relatively weak for women. In Kazakhstan, no clear 
pattern emerges. Among male Kazakh employees, average log earnings are the greatest for 
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workers with the lowest LOC scores, while among women the earnings are slightly higher 
for workers with average LOC. 
As mentioned earlier, the unusual patterns in the data may arise if other factors distort 
the outcomes. To obtain the net effect of personality on earnings we need to hold other 
factors fixed, and this is what we do in the next subsection. 
 
5.3. Earnings equations 
We estimate log earnings equations as described in Section 4. Regression results for 
Armenian, Kazakh, and Russian employees are reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. 
In the tables, the estimates show a typical concave age-earnings profile, although age effects 
are insignificant for Armenian and Kazakh workers. Tenure has an important effect on the 
earnings of participants of Kazakhstan survey, and the tenure-earnings profile is concave. 
The rate of return to a year of schooling is somewhat low; it exceeds 6% in the pooled 
Armenian and Kazakhstan regressions, but is under 4% for Russian workers. This result may 
have arisen because most of the participants of our surveys are well-educated
11
. 
Earnings of supervisors are substantially higher than earnings of regular workers. 
Depending on the sample (pooled, men, or women) and specification (LOC included or 
excluded), an increase in earnings due to having supervisory responsibilities is about 17-23% 
for Armenian workers, 17-18% for Kazakh workers, and 24-42% for Russian workers. 
                                                 
11
 About 30% of workers in the Armenian sample reported more than 15 years of schooling. For Kazakhstan 
and Russia the corresponding numbers are 33% and 39%, respectively. At the same time, an increase in 
earnings due to additional schooling beyond 15 years is unlikely to be large in these countries. Since most 
educational institutions in former socialist economies belong to the public sector, the gain from having an extra 
year of post-graduate education in these countries is not very large. In cases when workers received the second 
higher education or participated in retraining courses, the average return to a year of schooling for these workers 
must have been lower because the initial education/training was not particularly useful in the new market 
environment. 
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Among the participants of our surveys, earnings are lower for those working at the state-
owned enterprises, although the effects are not significant in Kazakhstan. 
Incorporating personality in the earnings analysis alters the coefficients slightly. 
Consistent with the findings that internal individuals tend to acquire more education 
(Coleman and DeLeire 2003) and are more likely to hold supervisory positions (Smith at al. 
1997), both the returns to education and supervisors’ rewards decrease. The effect of LOC on 
earnings is positive, indicating that workers with internal LOC tend to have higher earnings. 
The coefficient estimates are particularly large and highly significant in Armenian and 
Russian samples. Based on the estimates of non-discriminatory earnings structure obtained 
from pooled regressions, an increase in LOC by one standard deviation results in a 9.4% 
increase in earnings for Armenian employees, and the corresponding increase for Russian 
employees is about 10%. Given that the standardized LOC varies from -4 to 3.8 in Armenian 
sample, and it varies from -3.7 to 3.3 in Russian sample, the differences in earnings of the 
most internal and most external workers are substantial. For Armenian workers the 
corresponding gain would be a 73% increase in earnings, while for Russian workers the gain 
would be a 70% increase in earnings. Among the participants of the Kazakhstan survey, 
personality effects are much smaller. The coefficient of the LOC is not significant in men’s 
and women’s regressions, and it is only marginally significant in the pooled sample. 
With regard to gender differences, LOC has the same effect on the earnings of male 
and female participants of Armenian survey. In Kazakhstan and Russia, the effect of LOC on 
earnings is greater for men. Overall, the estimated effects of the LOC among the participants 
of our Armenian and Russian surveys are greater than those reported in the studies of 
developed market economies (Andrisanni 1978, Osborne Groves 2005). These findings 
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suggest that personality factor may be more important in changing economic environment 
than in stable labor markets. 
 
5.4. Gender pay gap decomposition 
The results from the earnings gap decomposition are reported in Table 8. The 
estimates show that a significant part of gender differences in log earnings is due to variation 
in education and position. In Armenian and Russian samples, women have lower earnings 
because they have fewer years of schooling and are less likely to hold supervisory positions. 
In Kazakhstan, the opposite is true. Female participants of the Kazakhstan survey have on 
average more years of schooling and many of these women have supervisory responsibilities, 
which gives them an earnings advantage over the male participants of the survey. In all three 
locations, women suffer a substantial disadvantage because they are more likely to work at 
state-owned enterprises. 
Similarly to other studies of transition economies (Ogloblin 1999, Jurajda 2003), we 
find that gender segregation is an important determinant of the male-female earnings gap in 
our data. Among the participants of Russian survey, segregation explains almost 20% of the 
gap, and among Armenian employees it explains about 22% of the gap. Interestingly, among 
Kazakh employees, gender differences are in favor of women. The overall effect of 
segregation on the gender earnings gap in Kazakhstan is negative (the gap is reduced), 
because women amount to a very small fraction of workers in light manufacturing, which is 
one of the lowest-paying sectors in the Kazakhstan sample. 
Regarding the personality factor, gender differences in LOC explain about 5.5% of 
the pay gap among Armenian employees and 7% of the gap among the participants of 
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Russian survey. These estimates are slightly larger than those obtained by Mueller and Plug 
(2004) for Wisconsin high school graduates. In Kazakhstan, personality differences explain 
less than 3% of the observed gender differences in log earnings, which is not surprising given 
the tiny gender differences in means of LOC among Kazakh employees. Importantly, 
accounting for workers’ LOC helps to reduce the unexplained part of the earnings 
differential. After LOC is incorporated in the earnings equations, the unexplained portion of 
the gap drops by roughly 8% in Armenia, 9.5% in Russia, and 1.3% in Kazakhstan. 
The fact that personality explains a remarkably small portion of gender pay gap 
among Kazakh workers follows from two findings. First, gender differences in means of the 
LOC measure are very small in the Kazakhstan sample, which is due to the prevalence of 
external LOC among male workers without supervisory responsibilities. Since in Kazakhstan 
personality patterns were found to be rather different depending on the supervisory status – 
among supervisors men tended to be more internal, while among regular workers women 
tended to be more internal – it may signal the necessity to consider these two groups of 
workers separately in the analysis of gender pay gap. And second, the estimated effect of 
LOC on earnings of Kazakh workers is relatively small and not significant at the 5% level, 
implying that either the non-cognitive skills associated with internal LOC do not enhance 
productivity, or wages do not reflect the true worker productivity in Kazakhstan. Although 
we do not have means to distinguish between these two explanations, we are inclined to 
believe that the major reason for personality effects being insignificant is the imperfect match 
between worker productivity and remuneration of labor. There is anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that young people in Kazakhstan typically receive help from friends and relatives 
in finding their initial employment. Moreover, Ardichvili (2001) finds that one of the most 
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important dimensions of work-related cultural values in Kazakhstan is paternalism in 
manager-employee relations. Although paternalism does not necessarily imply inefficiencies, 
in a paternalistic relationship managers feel responsible for guiding and protecting the 
workers, which in some circumstances may cause deviations from the profit-maximizing 
strategies. Paternalism is common for many Asian cultures, such as China, India, Japan, 
Korea, and Turkey (see Ardichvili 2001 for references), where “paternalistic relationships go 
beyond family boundaries, and vertical relationships in families extend to the workplace and 
social life” (Ardichvili 2001, p.366). 
 
6. Conclusion 
We considered personality factor (locus of control) as a determinant of earnings and 
gender differences in pay in three former socialist economies: Armenia, Kazakhstan, and 
Russia. We find that among Armenian and Russian workers, internal LOC is associated with 
higher earnings, men tend to be more internal than women, and gender differences in 
personality explain a nontrivial portion of the gender pay gap. In Kazakhstan, both the effect 
of LOC on earnings and male-female differences in personality were found to be small, so 
the role of personality in explaining the gender pay gap was minor. 
Reducing the gender pay gap requires both the enforcement of existing anti-
discrimination laws and development of new policies. Our findings suggest that in Armenia 
and Russia gender differences in pay can be diminished with the help of special programs 
that would encourage the formation of internal LOC in women. Early childhood programs 
were found to be effective in raising non-cognitive skills and promoting success of 
individuals in developed countries (Heckman et al. 2006). Introduction of similar programs 
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in the former socialist economies would be particularly beneficial for women, whose lack of 
non-cognitive skills makes them disadvantaged in the labor markets. 
Although our results shed some light on the significance of personality traits in 
determining productivity and gender differences in pay in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia, 
further studies of these and other transition and less developed countries are needed. The data 
we used in this study are not representative at the national level, and therefore, the 
applicability of our results is somewhat limited. By performing the conditional analysis of 
earnings we were able to reduce the distorting impact of the specificities of our data, which 
makes us confident that the personality effects observed in our data are similar to those 
present in the entire working populations of the three countries. Nevertheless, the goal of 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables 
 
  Armenia  Kazakhstan  Russia 
  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men 
          
Age  36.24 38.25  34.20 34.37  38.51 38.28 
  (10.92) (11.30)  (9.14) (10.31)  (11.14) (12.92) 
Tenure  6.24 6.09  5.41 4.62  9.78 8.16 
  (6.37) (5.54)  (4.94) (3.89)  (8.99) (7.81) 
Years of schooling  15.09 15.27  15.21 14.71  14.91 15.18 
  (2.00) (2.36)  (2.26) (2.38)  (2.32) (2.75) 
Manager  0.31 0.49  0.36 0.33  0.41 0.54 
Unemployment experience  0.28 0.27  0.35 0.37  0.20 0.24 
Job changes  0.64 0.70  0.71 1.02  0.58 0.76 
  (1.07) (1.11)  (1.17) (1.31)  (0.96) (1.24) 
State-owned enterprise  0.33 0.23  0.37 0.26  0.52 0.45 
Heavy manufacturing / 
energy 
 
0.05 0.05  0.04 0.02  0.05 0.05 
Light manufacturing  0.15 0.28  0.10 0.31  0.22 0.20 
Retail / wholesale trade  0.04 0.07  0.11 0.08  0.12 0.03 
Education / training  0.08 0.04  0.09 0.02  0.16 0.17 
Finance/banking  0.05 0.02  0.11 0.09  0.07 0.02 
Health care  0.24 0.18  0.21 0.17  0.17 0.12 
Public services  0.33 0.31  0.22 0.19  0.13 0.15 
Other services  0.04 0.03  0.03 0.06  0.07 0.20 




0.75   0.80   0.62  
          
Number of observations  717 521  372 327  548 225 
          
Standard deviations reported in parentheses under the sample means. 
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Table 2. Components of the LOC Measure 
 
Variable Name Description 
  
Internal  
NOLUCK Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
DESERVE In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world. 
PLAN When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work. 
MYSELF What happens to me is of my own doing. 
WANTLUCK In my case, getting what I want has little to do with luck. 
  
External  
GDLEADR Without the right breaks, one cannot be a good leader. 
BADLUCK Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck. 
WHOPROMO Who gets promoted often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right 
place first. 
ACCIDENT Most people do not realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by 
accidental happenings. 
NOINFLU Many times I feel I have little influence over the things that happen to me. 
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Table 3. Means for the LOC Measure and its Components by Gender 
 
 Armenia  Kazakhstan  Russia 











            
Internal 17.87 18.40 -0.53**  18.89 19.23 -0.34  17.19 17.66 -0.47* 
 (3.66) (3.74) (-2.48)  (3.41) (3.12) (-1.35)  (3.64) (3.48) (-1.67) 
NOLUCK 3.37 3.60   3.55 3.58   3.15 3.38  
 (1.16) (1.13)   (1.16) (1.16)   (1.30) (1.15)  
DESERV 3.71 3.74   3.92 3.89   3.67 3.63  
 (1.07) (1.11)   (1.08) (0.96)   (1.33) (1.31)  
PLAN 3.73 3.83   3.84 3.91   3.52 3.59  
 (1.00) (0.95)   (0.96) (1.02)   (1.10) (1.01)  
MYSELF 3.59 3.77   3.89 4.09   3.49 3.68  
 (1.09) (1.00)   (1.03) (0.90)   (1.26) (1.14)  
WANTLUCK 3.46 3.45   3.69 3.75   3.36 3.39  
 (1.04) (0.99)   (1.09) (1.03)   (1.21) (1.14)  
External 17.36 17.05 0.31  18.05 18.08 -0.03  16.62 15.42 1.20*** 
 (3.77) (3.78) (1.43)  (3.75) (3.79) (-0.12)  (4.14) (4.08) (3.67) 
GDLEADR 3.68 3.70   3.77 3.78   3.71 3.62  
 (1.12) (1.06)   (1.15) (1.08)   (1.24) (1.32)  
BADLUCK 3.36 3.28   3.52 3.50   2.94 2.73  
 (1.08) (1.13)   (1.20) (1.17)   (1.24) (1.13)  
WHOPROMO 3.62 3.56   3.64 3.75   3.60 3.28  
 (1.14) (1.07)   (1.15) (1.13)   (1.30) (1.34)  
ACCIDENT 3.46 3.40   3.66 3.69   3.46 3.10  
 (1.04) (1.04)   (1.03) (1.02)   (1.22) (1.16)  
NOINFLU 3.23 3.11   3.45 3.36   2.90 2.68  
 (1.05) (1.11)   (1.15) (1.20)   (1.25) (1.26)  
LOC 0.51 1.34 -0.84***  0.84 1.14 -0.30  0.57 2.24 -1.67*** 
 (4.58) (4.48) (-3.20)  (4.22) (4.43) (-0.92)  (5.70) (5.71) (-3.71) 
            
Number of 
observations 717 521  
 
372 327  
 
548 225  
            
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses under the sample means. 




Figure 1. Distribution of LOC by gender 
 
 










































































































































































































































Table 4. Sample Means of (Logarithm of) Earnings by LOC and Gender 
 
  Armenia  Kazakhstan  Russia 
  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men 
          
Total  11.03 11.34  9.92 10.03  8.45 8.86 
  (0.74) (0.73)  (0.47) (0.54)  (0.59) (0.68) 
          
LOC <= -5  10.81 11.11  9.90 10.23  8.32 8.71 
  (0.72) (0.87)  (0.54) (0.93)  (0.54) (0.70) 
-5 < LOC <= 0  10.97 11.25  9.92 9.93  8.49 8.77 
  (0.73) (0.72)  (0.44) (0.42)  (0.54) (0.62) 
0 < LOC <= 5  11.10 11.42  9.93 10.05  8.42 8.88 
  (0.73) (0.71)  (0.47) (0.52)  (0.64) (0.73) 
LOC > 5  11.22 11.48  9.89 10.18  8.52 9.00 
  (0.80) (0.71)  (0.56) (0.61)  (0.58) (0.68) 
          
Highest-Lowest LOC Category  0.41*** 0.37**  -0.01 -0.05  0.20** 0.29* 
  (3.52) (2.57)  (-0.07) (-0.26)  (2.50) (1.82) 
          
 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses under the sample means. 
For the earnings differences by LOC, t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimates. 
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Table 5. OLS Estimates for Log Earnings, Armenia 
 
 Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Age 0.019 0.006 0.023 0.022 0.005 0.029 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age
2
/100 -0.021 -0.004 -0.028 -0.024 -0.002 -0.033 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tenure -0.006 -0.021 0.005 -0.006 -0.019 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Tenure
2
/100 -0.001 0.025 -0.007 0.003 0.023 0.004 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.078) (0.041) (0.045) (0.079) 
Education 0.067*** 0.092*** 0.049*** 0.062*** 0.090*** 0.044*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Manager 0.205*** 0.165*** 0.179** 0.196*** 0.154*** 0.174** 
 (0.045) (0.058) (0.070) (0.045) (0.057) (0.070) 
Unemployed -0.207*** -0.127** -0.287*** -0.200*** -0.131** -0.268*** 
 (0.054) (0.067) (0.085) (0.053) (0.067) (0.083) 
# Job changes 0.037* 0.017 0.049 0.036* 0.022 0.043 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) 
State-owned enterprise -0.122 -0.001 -0.211* -0.142* -0.019 -0.233** 
 (0.077) (0.102) (0.118) (0.077) (0.102) (0.117) 
Heavy manufacturing / energy -0.753*** -0.820*** -0.637*** -0.764*** -0.846*** -0.635*** 
 (0.111) (0.164) (0.142) (0.112) (0.169) (0.141) 
Light manufacturing -0.447*** -0.484*** -0.396*** -0.456*** -0.492*** -0.401*** 
 (0.089) (0.162) (0.094) (0.091) (0.166) (0.097) 
Retail / wholesale trade -0.544*** -0.442** -0.551*** -0.540*** -0.457** -0.529*** 
 (0.120) (0.193) (0.148) (0.123) (0.195) (0.153) 
Education / training -1.022*** -1.089*** -0.870*** -1.002*** -1.086*** -0.835*** 
 (0.112) (0.167) (0.178) (0.115) (0.170) (0.184) 
Health care -1.512*** -1.603*** -1.247*** -1.493*** -1.594*** -1.240*** 
 (0.164) (0.198) (0.357) (0.167) (0.202) (0.368) 
Public services -0.672*** -0.749*** -0.538*** -0.657*** -0.743*** -0.518*** 
 (0.098) (0.152) (0.137) (0.100) (0.156) (0.136) 
Other services -0.633*** -0.673*** -0.535*** -0.627*** -0.686*** -0.515*** 
 (0.088) (0.157) (0.101) (0.090) (0.161) (0.103) 
Construction / transportation -0.533*** -0.778*** -0.276* -0.521*** -0.784*** -0.254 
 (0.133) (0.199) (0.166) (0.133) (0.203) (0.161) 
LOC - - - 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
    (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) 
Constant 10.444*** 10.276*** 10.634*** 10.451*** 10.314*** 10.585*** 
 (0.310) (0.429) (0.446) (0.307) (0.432) (0.439) 
       
Number of observations 1238 717 521 1238 717 521 
R-squared 0.1916 0.2070 0.1679 0.2053 0.2203 0.1802 
       
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
Analytical weights used in the pooled sample 
Reference industry category: finance/banking 
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Table 6. OLS Estimates for Log Earnings, Kazakhstan 
 
 Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Age 0.006 0.004 0.017 0.011 0.006 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
Age
2
/100 -0.005 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 -0.006 -0.023 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.024) (0.017) (0.026) (0.024) 
Tenure 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.008 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Tenure
2
/100 -0.143*** -0.185*** 0.008 -0.149*** -0.185*** -0.014 
 (0.053) (0.063) (0.066) (0.052) (0.062) (0.068) 
Education 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Manager 0.161*** 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.156*** 
 (0.040) (0.052) (0.057) (0.040) (0.052) (0.057) 
Unemployed -0.168*** -0.173*** -0.148* -0.168*** -0.174*** -0.147* 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.077) (0.050) (0.056) (0.077) 
# Job changes 0.000 0.024 -0.046 0.000 0.025 -0.047 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.030) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031) 
State-owned enterprise -0.327*** -0.289*** -0.271*** -0.330*** -0.286*** -0.293*** 
 (0.074) (0.090) (0.100) (0.075) (0.092) (0.101) 
Heavy manufacturing / energy -0.176 -0.115 -0.273 -0.182 -0.113 -0.303 
 (0.119) (0.128) (0.256) (0.119) (0.127) (0.260) 
Light manufacturing -0.198** -0.204* -0.272* -0.191** -0.199* -0.268* 
 (0.084) (0.114) (0.149) (0.083) (0.111) (0.147) 
Retail / wholesale trade 0.047 0.041 0.039 0.065 0.047 0.067 
 (0.086) (0.104) (0.152) (0.086) (0.104) (0.150) 
Education / training -0.087 -0.213 0.715 -0.077 -0.210 0.728 
 (0.173) (0.136) (0.638) (0.175) (0.138) (0.656) 
Health care -0.213** -0.259** -0.258 -0.184* -0.248* -0.216 
 (0.099) (0.127) (0.158) (0.098) (0.128) (0.160) 
Public services 0.129 0.004 0.173 0.134 0.004 0.190 
 (0.109) (0.128) (0.181) (0.109) (0.128) (0.180) 
Other services -0.016 -0.006 -0.060 0.006 0.003 -0.031 
 (0.081) (0.097) (0.147) (0.081) (0.096) (0.147) 
Construction / transportation 0.011 -0.039 -0.043 0.035 -0.029 -0.013 
 (0.097) (0.178) (0.149) (0.095) (0.177) (0.148) 
LOC - - - 0.043* 0.023 0.050 
    (0.023) (0.027) (0.035) 
Constant 8.913*** 8.922*** 8.953*** 8.821*** 8.865*** 8.866*** 
 (0.305) (0.414) (0.436) (0.302) (0.400) (0.438) 
       
Number of observations 699 372 327 699 372 327 
R-squared 0.2849 0.3360 0.3462 0.2915 0.3380 0.3536 
       
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
Analytical weights used in the pooled sample 
Reference industry category: finance/banking 
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Table 7. OLS Estimates for Log Earnings, Russia 
 
 Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Age 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.084*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.088*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) 
Age
2
/100 -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.091*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.095*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) 
Tenure -0.009 -0.004 -0.029 -0.009 -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) 
Tenure
2
/100 0.011 -0.001 0.093 0.007 -0.002 0.077 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.060) (0.031) (0.031) (0.063) 
Education 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.027 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) 
Manager 0.348*** 0.316*** 0.233*** 0.325*** 0.312*** 0.217** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.084) (0.047) (0.046) (0.084) 
Unemployed -0.092 -0.074 -0.158 -0.077 -0.070 -0.128 
 (0.073) (0.063) (0.126) (0.071) (0.063) (0.124) 
# Job changes 0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.019 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036) 
State-owned enterprise -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.422*** -0.357*** -0.366*** -0.390*** 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.113) (0.076) (0.082) (0.111) 
Heavy manufacturing / energy -0.016 -0.366* 0.155 -0.109 -0.379* 0.010 
 (0.155) (0.214) (0.197) (0.156) (0.214) (0.208) 
Light manufacturing -0.230 -0.497** 0.004 -0.280* -0.506** -0.082 
 (0.145) (0.202) (0.197) (0.145) (0.202) (0.200) 
Retail / wholesale trade -0.453*** -0.486** -0.499** -0.504*** -0.509** -0.537** 
 (0.136) (0.200) (0.195) (0.139) (0.200) (0.209) 
Education / training -0.263* -0.442** -0.186 -0.321** -0.474** -0.223 
 (0.159) (0.215) (0.211) (0.159) (0.215) (0.212) 
Health care -0.360* -0.482** -0.149 -0.426** -0.512** -0.193 
 (0.187) (0.218) (0.484) (0.191) (0.217) (0.509) 
Public services -0.445*** -0.620*** -0.229 -0.527*** -0.648*** -0.347 
 (0.165) (0.213) (0.238) (0.165) (0.213) (0.244) 
Other services 0.048 -0.092 0.104 0.003 -0.113 0.066 
 (0.142) (0.205) (0.186) (0.144) (0.204) (0.188) 
Construction / transportation 0.057 -0.155 0.108 -0.029 -0.189 0.024 
 (0.151) (0.214) (0.196) (0.152) (0.213) (0.200) 
LOC - - - 0.099*** 0.036* 0.107*** 
    (0.022) (0.021) (0.038) 
Constant 7.291*** 7.276*** 7.006*** 7.283*** 7.319*** 6.921*** 
 (0.341) (0.356) (0.589) (0.332) (0.354) (0.569) 
       
Number of observations 773 548 225 773 548 225 
R-squared 0.3614 0.3959 0.3467 0.3809 0.3994 0.3653 
       
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
Analytical weights used in the pooled sample 
Reference industry category: finance/banking 
Table 8. Decomposition of the Gender Earnings Differential. 
 















 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Gross differential 0.314 0.314  0.110 0.110  0.414 0.414 
         
Differences in characteristics:         
Age 0.005 0.006  -0.001 -0.002  -0.027 -0.028 
Tenure 0.001 0.0005  -0.004 -0.003  0.010 0.011 
Years of schooling 0.012 0.011  -0.032 -0.032  0.009 0.008 
Manager 0.037 0.035  -0.004 -0.004  0.043 0.040 
Unemployment experience 0.003 0.003  -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.003 
Job changes 0.002 0.002  0.00002 0.000001  0.0005 -0.001 
State-owned enterprise 0.012 0.014  0.035 0.035  0.025 0.023 
Heavy manufacturing / energy -0.005 -0.005  0.004 0.004  -0.0001 -0.001 
Light manufacturing -0.056 -0.057  -0.042 -0.041  0.004 0.005 
Retail / wholesale trade -0.012 -0.012  -0.001 -0.002  0.042 0.046 
Education / training 0.036 0.035  0.006 0.006  -0.004 -0.004 
Health care 0.043 0.043  0.005 0.004  0.019 0.023 
Public services 0.043 0.042  -0.005 -0.005  0.024 0.028 
Other services 0.011 0.011  0.0004 -0.0002  0.001 0.0001 
Construction / transportation 0.002 0.002  0.0004 0.001  0.007 -0.004 
LOC - 0.017  - 0.003  - 0.029 
         
Total explained differential 0.134 0.148  -0.042 -0.040  0.149 0.172 
         
Unexplained differential 0.177 0.163  0.152 0.150  0.265 0.242 
         
Percent explained by LOC  5.5%   2.7%   7.0% 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
